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“Short-termism” has been identified by many academics and business 
practitioners as a significant global problem in modern capitalist markets. The 
excessive focus of corporate decision-makers on short-term profit maximising 
goals, often at the expense of longer-term objectives, results in insufficient 
attention being paid to the strategy, fundamentals and the long-term value 
creation of an organisation. Agency theory provides a useful framework to begin 
to understand and address this problem, as it highlights the unaligned priorities 
of key stakeholders and decision-makers in capital markets. Institutional 
investor activism is a credible solution to short-term management behaviour 
and irresponsible shareholder pressures on management, because institutions 
usually hold significant interests in listed companies and have a vested interest 
in the long-term creation of corporate value. A substantial majority of the 
shareholding of most capital markets is owned by a concentrated group of mutual 
funds (collective investment schemes), pension plans, and other institutional 
investors such as hedge funds and medical aid schemes. Therefore the power 
to veto or at least control programs of raising dividends, increasing share buy-
backs, spinning off company divisions and requesting board representation 
really sits with institutional investors and this is a fact that institutional asset 
managers need to acknowledge. The power and the responsibility to implement 
sound principles and practices of corporate governance sits with institutional 
investors. This paper explores the questions of how and why institutional 
investors need to exert more influence on the boards of the companies to which 
they are invested. Can institutional investors be held to a more long-term view 
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of corporate governance? What are the reasons for the failure of institutional 
investors to date? The South African context, including recent events in corporate 
South Africa, which includes the 2016 release of the King IV Report on Corporate 
Governance, are applied to the issue. South Africa can stand proud of its codes of 
good practice that promote responsible institutional shareholder activism. 
1. Introduction
There has been a growing dissatisfaction internationally against corporate “short-
termism”, namely the concentration of company boards, especially large public-
interest and listed entities, on short-term profit objectives at the expense of long-
term value and wealth creation (Pozen, 2015). Short-termism is an excessive focus 
of decision-makers on short-term goals at the expense of longer-term objectives, 
resulting in insufficient attention being paid to the strategy, fundamentals and the 
long-term value creation of a firm or an institution (EY, 2014).
A 2003 survey performed of 401 senior financial executives in the United 
States explored the earnings benchmarks considered most important to the board 
of directors, as well as the factors which motivated them to deliver these earnings. 
The study found that the destruction of shareholder value through legal means is 
pervasive, perhaps even a regular occurrence in business decision making and the 
amount of value destroyed by companies striving to hit earnings targets exceeds 
the value lost in recent high-profile fraud cases. The majority of respondents 
reported that they would forgo current spending on profitable long-term projects 
to avoid missing earnings estimates for the upcoming quarter (Graham, Harvey, 
& Rajgopal, 2006).
Perhaps nowhere in recent corporate history are the damages of a managerial 
short-term profit seeking mind-set shown than in the circumstances that 
precipitated the 2008/9 global financial crisis. Large financial institutions 
were interested in selling as many loans as possible, creating an “originate-to 
distribute” model. The idea was to charge fees for giving credit, and then to 
use extremely complicated financial instruments in order to disperse the risk 
throughout the financial markets (the infamous collateralized debt obligation, 
CDOs). This gave incentive for banks to grant mortgages even to creditors 
unable to repay them (NINJA loans – “no income, no job and no assets”, also 
known as sub-prime loans), all the while assuming an increasing house price 
market. Those responsible for granting loans were not so much interested in the 
quality as in the quantity of new mortgages, for which they were rewarded with 
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bonuses. The financial markets started to act as if real estate prices would rise 
forever, loosening the creditworthiness criteria even further. The details of the 
sub-prime crisis and the following financial crisis are well documented today 
but needless to say, a moment was reached at which the consequences of short-
termism became evident – the real estate bubble was about to burst. The exotic 
financial instruments that were backed by the crucial mortgage-based cash 
flows, suddenly became recognised as extremely risky and overvalued assets. 
This left banks with a huge amount of “toxic assets”, raising the urgent need 
to repair their balance sheets, which required a significant tightening of credit 
criteria. This in turn adversely affected non-financial companies as the across-
the-board credit crunch left many of them unable to finance their activity. As a 
result, the economic slump became more and more severe and was spreading 
around the world. All this was directly a result of managerial profit pursuit, 
without acknowledging the risks involved and the longer-term sustainability 
of the transactions. Ultimately the true cost was paid by the investing and tax-
paying public.
As quoted by Martin (2015), Peter Drucker, a well known management 
consultant and author weighed in on the debate thirty years ago by saying in a 
Harvard Business Review editorial, “Everyone who has worked with American 
management can testify that the need to satisfy the pension fund manager’s 
quest for higher earnings next quarter, together with the panicky fear of the 
raider, constantly pushes top managements toward decisions they know to be 
costly, if not suicidal, mistakes”. However, Martin (2015) makes the point that 
some academics do debate whether short-termism even exists, and if it does, 
to what extent. The problem in coming to definite conclusions on the matter is 
that “there is no control group; we can’t compare the performance of America 
with short-termism to that of America devoid of short-termism – or even prove 
beyond a doubt that short-termism exists in the first place” (Martin, 2015). This 
does make research on the issue particularly difficult.
This managerial short-termism, also described as the cutting long-term 
investments, such as research and development, in order to meet or beat short-
term performance targets (Porter, 1992), has attracted increasing attention from 
researchers and practitioners in the last couple of decades. When one considers 
agency theory and the vested interests of executives, it is understandable why 
corporate “short-termism” exists and why it needs to be addressed. Management 
have goals that tend to be unaligned with other stakeholders, such as job security, 
salary increases, performance bonuses and share options to name but a few. 
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Management also has different aversion levels to risks in the organisation. The 
most common agency relationship of course is between shareholders (principal) 
and the company executives (agents). Agency theory is a well-researched area 
that is concerned with resolving these problems between principals and agents.
According to Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory emerged in the 1960s and 
1970s from the combined disciplines of economics and institutional theory 
when economists explored risk sharing among individuals or group. Academics 
were concerned with resolving two key problems that can occur in agency 
relationships of principal and agent. The first is the agency problem that arises 
when (a) the desires or goals of the principal (e.g. a shareholder who desires 
long-term value creation) and an agent (e.g. management who want to maximise 
their current year performance bonus) conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved 
appropriately in furthering the principal’s objectives and reason for hiring the 
agent. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal 
and agent have different attitudes toward risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). The problem 
here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of 
the different risk preferences, for example the shareholder wants to act more 
conservatively to preserve and maintain operations sustainably over the long-
term, whereby the company management are incentivised to take speculative 
bets in their decisions on the chance that profits in the period could be maximised. 
Hence we have the problem of managerial short-termism versus longer-term 
sustainable value creation.
However, it also needs to be acknowledged that not all shareholders are long-
term investors and sometimes it is the shareholders themselves who can pressure 
management to make short-term profit-maximising decisions at the expense of 
the longer-term sustainability of the business. Pozen (2015) identifies activist 
hedge funds that acquire 1% or 2% of a company’s shares and then push hard 
for measures designed to boost the stock price quickly but unsustainably, such 
as dividends increases, restructuring and share buy-backs. Rappaport (2005) 
explains the appeal that quarterly and annual profit announcements have in the 
mind of asset managers who manage millions of dollars of third party money 
in the form of pension funds and mutual-type funds (called unit trusts in South 
Africa). Agency theory may blame the misaligned incentives of management, 
but often it can also be certain activist shareholders who are also to blame for 
poor corporate governance and decision making.
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Academics and business practitioners are therefore faced with some 
fundamentally important questions. Can institutional investors be held to a 
more long-term investment horizon? What corporate governance principles can 
be promoted to achieve this? What arguments can be provided in defence of 
shareholder activism to “focus on long-term value creation”? What strategies 
can management offer that will sustainably grow long-term value? Continual 
research to offer better solutions to these key questions is certainly needed.
2. The significance of institutional shareholders
So we can perhaps understand why company executives can have a short-term 
mind-set at the expense on longer term sustainability. Therefore, as the principles 
of good corporate governance now explain, responsible shareholders who seek 
longer-term value creation, need to hold management to account and implement 
appropriate incentives and controls to bring the alignment that agency theory 
suggests. Controls such as appropriate long-term performance incentive schemes 
(share options or share schemes with long vesting periods and performance 
criteria, for example), or suitably experienced and independent non-executive 
directors on the boards, led by an experienced and independent chairman. 
However, these corporate governance principles are not always implemented 
properly and one of the primary reasons why is because of an apathy on behalf of 
shareholders in respect to monitoring management and holding them to account. 
A culprit who can be held especially to blame are the institutional shareholders, 
who usually account for the largest shareholding in large and listed companies. 
A substantial majority of the shareholding of most public companies in the 
United States is owned by a concentrated group of mutual funds, pension plans, 
and other institutional investors (Pozen, 2015). This situation is no different in 
other developed and developing economies. Institutions control the lion’s share 
of company equity of stock markets and as such have the greatest potential to 
change this problem of managerial short-termism.
But why should institutional investors care about management short-term 
profit seeking? Why should institutional managers want to actively promote 
long-term sustainable value decision-making in the companies in which they 
invest? There are a few good answers to this question, not least of which is the 
reasoning that pension funds need to be able to make long-term investments that 
are designed to match the liabilities inherent in meeting pension fund mandates 
and obligations that stretch over many years. This is especially true for insurance 
products and defined benefit retirement funds. Given the long-term nature of the 
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obligations and the interests of the third parties who own the funds, such as 
employees saving for retirement, institutional fund managers and their oversight 
bodies need to provide long-term growth of invested capital. Without such long-
term growth, expectations and legal liabilities will not be met and therefore, 
in a real sense, institutions are obligated legally and ethically to deliver long-
term sustainable value creation. Short-falls in meeting such obligations are born 
directly by the institutions themselves, or the organisations and individuals who 
provided the funds under management and mandated the institution to invest 
them with clearly defined objectives.
In addition to the above legal and ethical obligation to those who provide 
institutions with their money, institutional investors are often locked into the 
shareholding of most large companies on a long-term basis by the very nature 
of the investment business. Regulatory requirements, diversification and index 
investing (mostly based on market capitalisation or smart beta strategies) 
all contribute to the long-term nature of the shareholding and restrict large 
institutions from significantly reducing their holdings in a company. For 
example, if Company X Ltd. accounts for 7% of the top 100 companies on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) by market capitalisation, then an index 
fund that tracks the top 100 companies must hold this share in this proportion 
for the long term. If a Company Y Ltd. is one of the largest mining companies on 
the exchange, then surely it would be very difficult for many resource-focused 
unit trusts not to take significant holdings in this company for the long term. 
The largest pension fund in South Africa, the Government Employees Pension 
Fund (GEPF) is the largest single shareholder in many JSE companies and this 
situation will not change in the medium to long term. 
Thus institutional investors are long-term shareholders by nature, even if 
they do buy and sell on a regular basis, or lend their shares for a fee (called 
scrip lending). Due to these legal and practical restrictions, institutions have 
incentives to encourage good corporate governance that produces long-term 
value creation.
However, despite the above reasons for desiring long-term value creation, 
“short-termism” still seems to exist and significant efforts and engagement with 
institutional management is needed in order to promote better governance practices.
When asked to rank the most significant influences in the setting of company 
share price and in management’s development of earnings targets, institutional 
investors were ranked in the top two by over fifty percent of the respondents, 
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with the second most significant influence being analysts. Individual investors 
were a distant third most important influence (Graham et al., 2006). 
As already discussed, one of the important issues emerging from the 2008/9 
global financial crisis is the alleged negative role played by institutional investors 
leading up to and during the crisis period (Callen & Fang, 2013). Many observers 
maintain that institutional investors exacerbated the crisis by pressuring the 
management of financial service companies for short-term profits and thereby 
increasing their risk-taking behaviour.
According to Rappaport (2005), most investment professionals recognise 
that the value of a company’s equity is best estimated through valuing the 
future cash flow produced by that company. However, the problem lies in 
the belief that estimating the more distant cash flows is too time-consuming, 
costly, and speculative to be useful. This, together with the fact that analysts 
have significantly less information about a company's strategies, operations and 
prospects than insiders do (i.e. management), analysts tend to attach substantial 
weight to reported short-term performance (Rappaport, 2005). According to 
Rappaport (2005), an obsession with short-term performance is the result and 
this comes at the expense of long-term value creation in the companies involved.
A survey performed in 2012 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), across its 35 member countries, illustrates the role 
that large institutional investors can play in providing a source of stable long-
term capital. The survey reviews trends in assets and asset allocation by 86 large 
pension funds and Public Pension Reserve Funds (PPRFs), which in total manage 
nearly USD 10 trillion in assets, more than one third of the total worldwide 
assets held by this class of institutional investors. Total assets managed by all 
types of institutional investors in OECD countries in 2012 was estimated to be 
USD 83 trillion, of this USD 22 trillion through pension funds. The average 
asset allocation by these institutional funds was found to be as follows:
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FiGuRe 1: aveRaGe asset allocation
Source: OECD, Institutional Investors and Long-term Investment (2014)
A similar report by the OECD in 2011 provided the following proportion of total 
assets held as equity by institutional investor type:
FiGuRe 2: equity assets By type oF institutional asset owneR
Source:  OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance (2011) 
It is therefore clear that institutional investors represent a major force in many 
capital markets. With the goal of optimising returns for targeted levels of risk, as 
well as for prudential regulation, institutional investors diversify investments into 
large portfolios, many of them having investments in thousands of companies 
(OECD, 2011).
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Institutional investors are an obvious solution to irresponsible shareholder 
pressures on management, simply because institutions usually hold significant 
interests in listed companies. It is with this reality in mind that Laurence Fink, the 
CEO of BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the world, which manages over 
$4 trillion in assets, in February 2016 sent a letter to the chief executives of S&P 
500 companies. In this letter Mr Fink warned company executives that they may 
be harming long-term value creation by capitulating to pressure from activist 
hedge funds to increase dividends and share buybacks. Executives were warned 
to resist “the powerful forces of short-termism afflicting corporate behaviour”, 
urging them towards “working instead to invest in long-term growth” (Fink, 
2016).
“While we’ve heard strong support from corporate leaders for taking such a long-
term view, many companies continue to engage in practices that may undermine 
their ability to invest for the future. Dividends paid out by S&P 500 companies 
in 2015 amounted to the highest proportion of their earnings since 2009. As of 
the end of the third quarter of 2015, buybacks were up 27% over 12 months. We 
certainly support returning excess cash to shareholders, but not at the expense of 
value-creating investment. We continue to urge companies to adopt balanced capital 
plans, appropriate for their respective industries, that support strategies for long-
term growth.” (Fink, 2016)
Do institutional investors usually take a stand either for or against proposals 
by activist minority shareholders? Warning against executives being unduly 
influenced by activist shareholders with short-term goals, Mr. Fink goes on to 
state in his letter:
“Without clearly articulated plans, companies risk losing the faith of long-term 
investors. Companies also expose themselves to the pressures of investors focused 
on maximizing near-term profit at the expense of long-term value. Indeed, some 
short-term investors (and analysts) offer more compelling visions for companies 
than the companies themselves, allowing these perspectives to fill the void and build 
support for potentially destabilizing actions. Those activists who focus on long-
term value creation sometimes do offer better strategies than management. In those 
cases, BlackRock’s corporate governance team will support activist plans. During 
the 2015 proxy season, in the 18 largest U.S. proxy contests (as measured by market 
cap), BlackRock voted with activists 39% of the time.” (Fink, 2016)
In the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis where institutional investors 
were accused of placing undue pressure on financial service entities for short-
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term profitability, causing the management of these entities to pursue higher 
risk behaviour (Callen & Fang, 2013), even the European Union acknowledged 
the problem. The European Union officially stated that the financial crisis had 
undermined the assumption of institutional investors as responsible investors 
(The European Parliament, 2010). In strong and unequivocal terms the G20/
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which were drafted in light of the 
2008-09 financial crisis and the accusations against institutional investors, states 
in its foundational principles that:
“the effectiveness and credibility of the entire corporate governance system and 
company oversight will… to a large extent depend on institutional investors that 
can make informed use of their shareholder rights and effectively exercise their 
ownership functions in companies in which they invest.” (OECD, 2011)
3. Opposing views:  “monitoring” vs “short-termism”
According to Callen and Fang (2013), the literature provides essentially two 
opposing views with regard to institutional investor incentives and activities in 
corporate activism. These researchers label the opposing views as “monitoring” 
and “short-termism”. The monitoring view argues that institutional shareholders, 
due to their large shareholding, have the incentive to actively monitor 
management and stay informed on corporate activity, since they stand to reap 
a greater reward for their efforts. Therefore these institutional shareholders 
monitor and discipline management in order to ensure that investment strategies 
promote longer term value creation. Literature is cited to show findings to this 
effect. However, Callen and Fang (2013) also cite literature that shows empirical 
evidence for the short-termism view, suggesting that institutional investors trade 
heavily on current earnings announcements, place excessive emphasis of short-
term performance and fail to correct excessive CEO compensation. Many critics 
claim that, by acting as traders, institutional investors place excessive emphasis 
on short-term performance, causing management to be overly concerned that 
near-term earnings disappointments will induce heavy selling by institutional 
investors and the undervaluation of stock price (Callen & Fang, 2013; Manconi, 
Massa, & Ayako, 2012). In light of these mixed findings, the study by Callen 
and Fang (2013) supported the “monitoring” view.
4. Institutional reluctance 
Are institutional investors perhaps giving lip service to long-term value 
creation while privately advocating for the more short-term agendas of minority 
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shareholder activists? In their defence, there are many reasons, provided below, 
which could explain why these institutions are generally reluctant to be proactive 
in pushing for long-term reforms in company strategy at shareholder meetings. 
The following is a brief discussion of some of these reasons.
Reason 1: The nature of institutional investors has evolved over the years 
into a complex system of financial institutions and fund management companies 
with their own corporate governance issues and incentive structures. Conflicts of 
interest and misaligned performance incentives, especially regarding financial 
remuneration of institutions managers, can discourage the type of shareholder 
activism that promotes decisions that sacrifice short term profitability in 
pursuit of broader stakeholder needs and long-term value creation (OECD, 
2011). According to Barton (2011), fund trustees, often advised by investment 
consultants, assess their institutional management performance relative to 
benchmark indices that encourage short-termism. Management compensation 
is linked to the amount of assets they manage, which typically rises when short-
term performance is strong. Not surprisingly, then, management focus on such 
performance and pass this emphasis along to the companies in which they invest. 
Reason 2: Many assets under management are held in index funds. Funds that 
track a market index or follow a smart beta strategy generally do not require 
analysts and managers with in-depth knowledge of the underlying companies. 
Over 30% of US stock assets under management are now held in index mutual 
funds or exchange-traded funds that are based on indexes (Udland, 2016). 
Hence, such index funds are not in a good position, or do not have the incentive, 
to analyse a shareholder activist’s program for change. A 1993 survey of the 
40 largest U.S. pension funds, 40 largest investment managers, and 20 largest 
charitable foundations indicated that while some index fund managers were 
highly active at shareholder meetings, most were completely passive (Useem, 
Bowman, Myatt, & Irvine, 1993).
Actively managed funds tend not to assert a strong position on either side of 
a voting proxy fight, unless doing so meets a cost-benefit test (Pozen, 1994). 
The cost of participation is high because it requires management time (the 
institution’s management) and potential litigation.
Reason 3: The free-rider problem exists in that an activist incurs all the costs of 
the campaign to secure proxies, yet most of the benefits go to other shareholders 
who have not contributed to the efforts (Pozen, 2015).
Reason 4: A number of asset managers have effectively outsourced their 
research and voting decisions in public company elections to proxy advisory 
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firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis. Do these 
outsourced organisations have a long-term perspective? According to a study on 
outsourced voting by advisory firms, four sizable asset managers disclosed that 
they uniformly follow the voting recommendations of one proxy adviser. These 
results suggested that this outsourcing appears to have the unintended economic 
consequence that boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease 
shareholder value (Larcker, McCall, & Ormazabal, 2015). 
Reason 5: Depending on the nature of the institution and the inherent 
incentives, fund managers are incentivised differently with respect to 
shareholder activism. For example, hedge funds frequently concentrate a large 
portion of their assets in relatively few company shares (Pozen, 2015). Hedge 
fund managers also often partake in significant performance fees linked to fund 
return. These characteristics do not exist for pension fund trustees or labour 
union representatives for example. Thus, the cost-to-benefit ratio in proxy fights 
is much better for the more concentrated funds in comparison to diversified 
mutual or pension funds.
Reason 6: Hedge funds can control a much higher percentage of proxy votes 
than their beneficial interest in the company’s shares through a practice called 
“empty voting”. For example, asset managers can lend their shares to a hedge 
fund and then not recall them for a contested proxy vote. Modern hedging 
techniques readily permit investors to separate ownership of the economic risks 
of shares from ownership of the right and ability to vote with those shares. As 
a result, activist investors (usually hedge funds) sometimes create large hedge 
positions solely to gain the vote, while avoiding economic exposure to the 
market. These empty voting positions are used solely to affect the outcome a 
shareholder vote (Nathan, 2007).
Reason 7: Since the costs of monitoring companies is high, as well as time 
consuming, especially considering the number of companies with which 
institutional funds invest, institutional investors may just sell off their shares 
and bonds in response to unfavourable performance rather than influencing 
corrective action (Manconi et al., 2012).
Reason 8: The strategy of many institutional investors is to diversify 
portfolio risk and maintain liquidity by investing in the equity of many different 
companies. This strategy may result in indifference regarding the governance 
of individual corporations and the incentive to ‘‘walk away’’ from influencing 
corporate activities rather than actively engage (Callen & Fang, 2013).
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Considering the above incentives and realities of the investment management 
industry, can institutional investors be held to a more long-term view? What 
arguments can be provided in defence of Laurence Fink’s call to shareholder 
activism to “focus on long-term value creation” and to engagement with 
management to “offer better strategies than management” that will sustainably 
grow long-term value?
5. Finding solutions
In light of the clear empirical evidence of short-term profit making decisions 
by company boards, many commentators and researchers express the same 
sentiment as Barton (2011), that “to break free of the tyranny of short-termism, 
we must start with those who provide capital” (Barton, 2011). Researchers and 
practitioners have argued that managerial short-termism can be alleviated by 
enhancing effective monitoring of company management to discourage narrow-
minded and biased behaviour or by granting managers with long-term incentive 
compensation (Chen, Cheng, Lo, & Wang, 2012). Such approaches increase the 
expected costs of such short-term decision-making to managers and hopefully 
will prevent managers from engaging in it (Chen et al., 2012). Recent research, 
such as  that done by Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010), that questions the 
overall effectiveness of board monitoring, highlights such concerns and makes 
a recommendation to promote oversight through placing independent non-
executive directors on boards.
Barton (2011) makes the argument for three essential elements to promote the 
deep reform that is required by business to combat the damage caused by short-
termism. There needs to be a fundamental shift in business, starting with firstly 
revamping managerial incentives and structures. Secondly, “executives must 
infuse their organizations with the perspective that serving the interests of all 
major stakeholders – employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, communities, 
the environment  – is not at odds with the goal of maximizing corporate value” 
(Barton, 2011). Thirdly, shareholders must become more active and engaged 
in corporate governance and then make sure the board is empowered to govern 
like owners, rather than managers. This third point is particularly relevant to the 
role of the institutional investor in corporate governance and part of the answer 
suggested is what Barton (2011) calls “redefining shareholder democracy”. Long-
term shareholders, with long-term value creation objectives, need to recognise 
their responsibility to actively govern the companies that they have significant 
shareholding in. High shareholder turnover from increased speculative trading 
285
Harber: The role of institutional investors in promoting long-term value creation
in the markets, which produce short holding periods and vote-buying practices, 
may even require standard setters and corporate governance bodies to reconsider 
the concept of “one share, one vote” principle of governance, at least in some 
circumstances (Barton, 2011). 
Perhaps a partial answer lies in providing more voting power to those 
individuals and institutions who meet certain criteria that prove them to be long-
term shareholders? 
An interesting finding by Callen and Fang (2013) was that institutional 
ownership by public pension funds, as opposed to bank trusts, investment 
companies, and independent investment advisors, is significantly negatively 
associated with future crash risk, consistent with findings that pension funds 
more actively monitor management than other types of institutions. Surely then 
more active monitoring, which means active engagement in the governance of 
companies, promotes long-term value creation and sustainable operations? The 
findings of Callen and Fang (2013) advocate for more institutional involvement, 
and specifically of the kind being shown by large pension fund custodians. Other 
institutional managers should play close attention to findings such as these.
From the possible solutions provided above, it is clear that the answer to 
short-termism is mostly to be found in better corporate governance principles. 
Providers of capital need to be more active in controlling company activities. 
Remuneration of management needs to incentivise long-term objectives. Boards 
must have sufficient numbers of independent directors appointed by shareholders 
to keep management in check. The obligations, both legally and ethically, of 
shareholders and management need to be clearly communicated and understood. 
These are all key corporate governance issues that are to some degree explained 
and recommended in corporate governance codes around the world. 
6. The South African context 
Similar to other countries, the assets under management in equity by institutions 
such as asset managers, pension funds and insurers, is very significant relative 
to total funds invested. As an example, Coronation Fund Managers  and Allan 
Gray represent the two largest equity asset management houses, as of March 
2016, with total assets under management in the form of unit trusts of R240 
billion and R237 billion respectively (Cairns, 2016). At this time total assets 
under management by Coronation Fund Managers was approximately R600 
billion. According to the Association for Savings and Investments SA (ASISA), 
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the total equity managed by its members in collective investments schemes, as 
of September 2016 was R368.5 billion, excluding foreign equity (Association 
for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA), 2016).
These figures are clearly very significant. The asset management industry in 
South Africa therefore surely bears a large degree of responsibility to fight short-
termism in listed companies. Nevile Chester (2016), a senior member of the 
equity investment team at Coronation Fund Managers, outlined Coronation’s 
commitment to responsible investing and actively engaging with management 
of the companies to which Coronation invests. According to Chester (2016):
Coronation engages regularly with the boards and management of the companies 
it is invested in. All these engagements are documented to ensure detailed record-
keeping and accountability for boards, as well as for investors to be fully informed 
as to how their investment is being exercised in the interests of good corporate 
governance.
When there are specific concerns, our first approach is to engage with management 
to deal with the respective issues. If this fails to deliver the appropriate action, we 
then escalate the issue to the board. When governance issues emerge, we do not 
believe selling out of a company is an appropriate first response. This runs the risk 
of incurring losses on the investment, and fails to live up to the demands of being a 
good corporate citizen, who should strive to ensure that companies are applying the 
correct standards of governance for the protection of all investors.
If we are not satisfied by the board’s response, we will then exercise our rights as 
shareholders in a general meeting to vote in a way that ensures the board will listen 
to our governance concerns. Clients often ask why we typically are not seen to lodge 
opposing votes at AGMs – the reality is that we often engage extensively with boards 
and management well ahead of any votes. We want to ensure that our concerns are 
dealt with before the vote. It is only in those cases where the company refuses to 
take our suggestions on board, that we do end up voting against resolutions.
In the event that all these interventions fail, we will look to remove board members 
who we believe are not exercising their fiduciary responsibilities in shareholders’ 
interests. This is always the last resort and, given the reputational impact, not 
something that we do lightly. We will always approach the board and the individuals 
upfront and deal with this process in a professional manner. Ambushing directors 
at an AGM with a surprise vote is not in our opinion acting in investors’ or the 
company’s best interests.(Chester, 2016)
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On the issue of proxy voting, Coronation also apparently “endeavors to vote 
on all shares in its portfolios. We report to clients on our voting record and the 
reasons for our positions on a regular basis.” (Chester, 2016). Allan Gray make 
similar claims and provide public record (via their website) of their voting 
recommendations, together with the outcome of the shareholders’ vote on each 
relevant resolution. These efforts are to be commended.
Does this happen in practice regularly? And if so, how many asset managers 
and other types of institutional investors are doing this?
A controversial example of what many have called responsible institutional 
activism, is the recent stand (August 2016) made by Futuregrowth Asset 
Management (owned by Old Mutual), Africa’s largest specialist fixed-income 
money manager, to stop lending money to six of South Africa’s largest state 
companies (Cohen, 2016). This decision caused significant media attention and 
major criticism from the South African government. What was the reason for 
this decision by the board of Futuregrowth? Simply put, they were concerned 
about how state companies were being run, government infighting and threats 
to the independence of the finance ministry, and they were not prepared to 
place client money at risk. Futuregrowth was clear that it would only resume 
offering loans and rolling over existing debt once it had determined that what 
it sees as proper oversight and governance has been restored (Cohen, 2016). 
It is encouraging to see an institution, which stands to lose a lot in the way of 
client funds and reputation, making a stand on behalf their clients and sending 
a message against perceived poor governance practices that can destroy value.
7. Recommendations of the King IV Report
The King IV Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa superseded the 
King III Report as of November 2016 when it was officially released by the King 
Committee and the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA). According 
to Professor Mervyn King SC, who is chairperson of the King Committee 
in South Africa, “the overarching objective of King IV is to make corporate 
governance more accessible and relevant to a wider range of organisations and 
to be the catalyst for a shift from a compliance-based mind-set to one that sees 
corporate governance as a lever for value creation” (IoDSA, 2016).
King IV, like its predecessor, emphasises the need for responsible corporate 
citizenship, stakeholder centric governance, long-term value creation and 
ethical leadership by those charged with governing organisations. And like its 
predecessor, its principles and recommendations, if applied by institutional 
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investors and by company boards, will result in a real end to the problem of 
short-term profit seeking and value destruction.
However, King IV goes even further with regards to the responsibilities of 
institutional investors. Whereas the previous King reports were written from the 
perspective of the governing body as the focal point of corporate governance, 
King IV broadens the application to include institutional investor responsibilities 
(referred to as a fiduciary duty for an institutional investor). Of the 17 principles 
in the King IV Report (down from 75 in King III), one relates specifically to 
institutional investors. This illustrates the importance of responsible institutional 
activity in governing companies to which they have holdings.
According to principle 17 of King IV (the last principle), institutional investor 
governing bodies should ensure that responsible investment is practiced by 
the organisation to promote the good governance and the creation of value 
by the companies in which they invest (King IV IoDSA, 2016). They are to 
manage their rights, obligations, legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and 
expectations, as holders of beneficial interest in the securities of companies. 
One of the foundational concepts in Part 1 of King IV is shareholder activism 
and specific emphasis is made regarding the role of institutional investors, 
who should pursue “principles of responsible investment towards long-term, 
sustainable returns” and understand that the types of decisions they make and 
how they exercise their rights as shareholders, either reinforce or weaken good 
governance in the companies in which they invest” (King IV IoDSA, 2016).
As King IV reminds readers, these principles are already contained, in more 
detail, in the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) issued in 
2011. The CRISA provides in Principle 3 that "where appropriate, institutional 
investors should consider a collaborative approach to promote acceptance and 
implementation of the principles of this Code and other codes and standards 
applicable to institutional investors” (CRISA IoDSA, 2011). This correlates 
with the UN-backed Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) launched in 
March 2006. These principles encourage collaborative engagement to better 
incorporate environmental, social and governance issues in decision-making 
and ownership practices.
The King IV Report even goes so far as to provide a sector supplement for 
retirement funds in order to provide high-level guidance and direction on how 
King IV could be interpreted and applied.
Other aspects of good corporate governance that seek to limit short-term 
profit seeking and create long-term value focus, remain key areas in the King 
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IV Report. Examples of such being board composition, director functions, sub-
committee composition and function, and of course director remuneration. 
Remuneration principles remain a major focus in King IV Report with the 
guidance and recommended practices being further developed and refined. How 
much South African executives earn, and why, is an important focus of the King 
IV, which introduces the idea that executive pay should be “fair and responsible” 
in the context of overall employee pay.
South Africa can stand proud of its heritage of world class codes of 
good governance. The King IV Report will no doubt, like King III, be seen 
internationally as the benchmark guidance for corporate governance. The new 
JSE listing requirements, released for public comment in November 2016, will 
no doubt incorporate King IV. However, at the end of the day, the King IV is not 
legislation and remains a self-regulating document that does not enjoy the force 
of the law. Will institutional investors respond and improve their shareholder 
activism and improve the quality of corporate governance in South Africa? If 
short-termism persists, it surely won’t be because of a lack of guidance. If short-
termism persists, surely the problem lies elsewhere. I believe there is much 
scope for South African specific research on the role and the performance of 
institutional investors.
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